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More Than "Shreds and Patches":
California's First Bill of Rights
By CHRISTIAN G. FRITz*
Annoyed by his colleagues lack of originality, one delegate to Cali-
fornia's first constitutional convention accused his fellow delegates of
"servilely" copying provisions of pre-existing American constitutions.'
He wondered why the California constitutional convention "was not as
capable of being original as any other," and he urged his fellow delegates
not to make California's first state constitution a mere composition "of
shreds and patches."2
This delegate's outburst may have reflected his frustration at not
having greater influence on the form and substance of the provisions the
convention was adopting as California's first "Declaration of Rights."3
But his comment also raises questions of considerable importance and
relevance today: What sources did the founding fathers of the California
Constitution draw upon to fashion the state's first bill of rights? How did
they understand that process of incorporating fundamental principles
into the constitution and what did they achieve?
Although the 1849 constitution was superseded by the 1879 consti-
tution, the original bill of rights provisions have largely survived and re-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1975; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law,
1978; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1986. The author would like to thank Ms.
Donna Penwell and the staff of Colton Hall Museum, Monterey, California, for their splendid
assistance, Michael Browde, Joseph Franaszek, and Marlene Keller for their extremely helpful
comments, and Dean Theodore Parnall for providing a research grant that supported this
work.
I. The delegate was Charles T. Botts, representing Monterey and a lawyer who origi-
nally came from Virginia. His remarks, as part of the debates of the convention, were officially
recorded by 3. Ross Browne. See J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVEN-
TION OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 51 (1850).
2. Id.
3. For clarity, this Article will refer to California's Declaration of Rights as a bill of
rights since what was routinely referred to as a declaration of rights in the context of 18th and
19th-century state constitution-making is now commonly termed a bill of rights. See SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS passim (W. Swindler ed. 1973-1979).
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main applicable today.4 Indeed, of the twenty-eight sections that
compose California's present bill of rights, only eight are not directly
based on'the protections guaranteed under the 1849 constitution.' The
constitution-making at Colton Hall in Monterey 140 years ago takes on
added importance given that independent state constitutional grounds
are currently being urged and accepted as giving broader protection for
individual rights and liberties than those provided by the Federal Consti-
tution.6 Indeed, the debate over the role of state constitutions, much of it
stimulated by decisions of the California Supreme Court, has produced
an extensive literature.7 Most of the commentary focuses only on
whether state constitutions should receive independent attention, why
this is so, and how this should be reduced to practice.
There has been a remarkable dearth of scholarly writing on nine-
teenth century constitution-making.8 As one scholar recently has ob-
served, "[F]ew themes in the history of American government have been
4. The second constitution was adopted in convention on March 3, 1879, and ratified by
the voters on May 7, 1879.
5. The 20 sections of California's present Declaration of Rights that are largely based on
the declaration of rights passed in 1849 are the following sections of the California Constitu-
tion: art. I, § 1 (virtually verbatim from 1849 section 1); art. I, § 2 (1849 section 9); art. I, § 3
(1849 section 10); art. I, § 4 (1849 section 4); art. I, § 5 (1849 sections 12 and 13); art. I, § 6
(1849 section 18); art. I, § 9 (1849 section 16); art. I, § 10 (1849 section 15); art. I, § 11 (1849
section 5); art. I, § 12 (1849 sections 6 and 7); art. I, § 13 (virtually verbatim from 1849 section
13); art. I, § 14 (1849 section 8); art. I, § 15 (1849 section 8); art. I, § 16 (1849 section 3); art. I,
§ 17 (1849 section 6); art. I, § 18 (virtually verbatim from 1849 section 20); art. I, § 19 (1849
section 8); art. I, § 20 (1849 section 17); art. I, § 21 (1849 article XL section 14 was incorpo-
rated into the bill of rights in 1974); art. I, § 24 (1849 section 21).
The eight sections of article I of the California Constitution that are not derivative of the
1849 constitution are the following: art. I, § 7 (pupil school assignment or transportation,
privileges and immunities); art. I, § 8 (employment discrimination); § 22 (voting not condi-
tioned on property qualification); art. I, § 23 (grand jury); art. I, § 25 (fishing rights); art. I,
§ 26 (provisions of the constitution mandatory or prohibitory); art. I, § 27 (death penalty); art.
I, § 28 (Victim's Bill of Rights).
6. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980).
7. Much of this literature is conveniently noted in Linde, supra note 6, at 396 n.70; see
also Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1324 (1982); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme
Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 (1982); The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REv. 959, 959-1375 (1985); State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 391, 391-478 (1988); R. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1988).
8. For exceptions dealing with the Western experience, see G. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 1850-1912 (1987); Reid, Governance of the Elephant: Constitu-
tional Theory on the Overland Trails, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421 (1978); J. Smurr,
Territorial Constitutions: A Legal History of the Frontier Governments Erected by Congress
in the American West, 1787-1900 (1960) (unpublished dissertation).
rVol. 17:13
Fall 19891 "HESADPTHS
less adequately studied."9 Even a cursory examination of the process by
which California's first state constitutional convention drafted a bill of
rights suggests the potential insights to be gleaned from nineteenth cen-
tury state constitutions.
The background and specific proceedings of the Monterey Conven-
tion have received attention from historians, as have specific substantive
controversies within the convention.'" On the other hand, little attention
has been paid to the nature of the constitution-making, its sources and
models, the attitudes of the delegates, and the core values they sought to
protect. I' Indeed, nineteenth century state constitution-making gener-
ally has been neglected, overshadowed by studies dealing with the Fed-
eral Constitution. This is unfortunate because the nineteenth century
state constitutional conventions produced constitutions that reflected
both continuities with eighteenth century American constitutionalism
and the concerns of the age in which they were created.'" California's
1849 constitution (as well as the other state constitutions drafted in the
previous century) ought to be considered in this broader context of nine-
teenth century political thought. The objective of this Article is to begin
that inquiry with a preliminary exploration of the extent to which ex-
9. Keller, The Politics of State Constitutional Revision, 1820-1930, in K. HALL, H. Hy-
MAN & L. SIGAL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AS AN AMENDING DEVICE 68 (1981).
10. For treatment of the California Constitutional Convention of 1849, see H. BANCROFT,
HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 284-304 (1888); R. HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CALIFORNIA'S FIRST
CONSTITUTION (1848-1849) (1895); C. GOODWIN, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE GOVERN-
MENT IN CALIFORNIA, 1846-1850 (1914); J. Ellison, The Struggle for Civil Government in
California, 1846-1850, 10 CAL. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 3, 3-26 (1931); Bayard, California's First Con-
stitution: A Reflection of the Political Philosophy of the Frontier, 4 PAc. HIST. REv. 221, 221-
34 (1935); J. ROYCE, CALIFORNIA: FROM THE CONQUEST IN 1846 TO THE SECOND VIGI-
LANCE COMMITTEE IN SAN FRANCISCO 205-13 (1948); Bowman, The Original Constitution of
California of 1849, 28 CAL. HIST. SoC'Y Q. 193, 193-97 (1949); Crotty, The California Consti-
tutional Convention of 1849, 31 CAL. HIST. SoC'Y Q. 155, 155-66 (1949); W. Ellison, Constitu-
tion Making in the Land of Gold, 18 PAC. HIST. REV. 319, 319-30 (1949); David, Our
California Constitutions: Retrospections in This Bicentennial Year, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
697, 710-22 (1976); N. HARLOW, CALIFORNIA CONQUERED 338-53 (1982); Grodin, Some
Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 391-96 (1988).
11. One important exception is D. Johnson, Pioneers and Politics: State Making in the
Far West 1845-1865 (1977) (unpublished dissertation).
12. See, e.g.j F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
STATES, 1776-1860 (1930); B. Still, State Constitutional Development in the United States,
1829-1851 (1933) (unpublished dissertation); W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1980); AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (K. Hall & J. Ely ed. 1989). The abundance of raw materials to
study development of state constitutionalism is suggested by the fact that some 226 state con-
stitutional conventions were convened between 1776 and 1976. See Keller, supra note 9, at 69.
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isting nineteenth century state constitutions were drawn upon in the cre-
ation of the bill of rights portion of California's first constitution.
1. More Than Copying
On the centennial of the 1849 constitution, one historian, Robert
Glass Cleland, characterized the state's first constitution as "not a highly
original document."' 3 Agreeing with an earlier historian who concluded
that the 1849 constitution was "practically a compilation of articles and
sections from other constitutions," 14 Cleland saw such extensive borrow-
ing as evidence that the delegates were "realists instead of theorists."' 5
As he put it, "[I]f they suffered from a dearth of new political ideas, they
at least produced a good run-of-the-mill, workable constitution."'
16
Both historians missed an important point about the convention.
Each implicitly equated originality of wording and concepts with a truer
or more legitimate process of constitution-making. Therefore, each im-
plied that the 1849 convention was less significant by virtue of not having
created a "novel" product. Those who have shared this judgment about
the convention's work were correct in one respect but wrong in a more
significant and profound way. With some notable exceptions, the dele-
gates' discussion over California's first bill of rights concededly did not
demonstrate much originality of subject matter. But they did display an
acute awareness of the significance of the process they were engaged in
and the significance of the provisions they adopted--original or not.
On one level it was and is unrealistic to expect that a constitutional
convention called in the mid-nineteenth century would or should be able
to make unique contributions to American political life. Most of the
state constitutions enacted after 1787 used the Federal Constitution as a
partial model,'" and by the time the California delegates met, state con-
stitutions routinely borrowed heavily from earlier state models.18 In-
deed, the ability of nineteenth century constitutional conventions to
make wide-ranging comparisons with other state constitutions was facili-
tated by the existence of numerous pocket-sized compilations of state
13. Introduction to CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1849, at 8 (R. Cleland
ed. 1949).
14. Id. at 9. Cleland quoted the work of historian Cardinal L. Goodwin. See C. GOOD-
WIN, supra note 10.
15. Cleland, supra note 13, at 9.
16. Id.
17. W. ADAMS, supra note 12.
18. See W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, passim.
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constitutions.19 In terms of the core subject matter for a bill of rights, by
1849 the constitutional field had been thoroughly explored. One delegate
to Oregon's first state constitutional convention in 1857 remarked that
"[t]he making of a constitution now is not such an interesting proceeding
as it may have been heretofore. What is said and done is not of that
character, and the constitution that we make, and every principle we can
engraft into it, has been discussed and decided time and again."20
As with any new political body, the initial concerns were procedural
in nature. Disagreement existed over whether several or only one com-
mittee should be formed to draft proposed sections of the constitution.2
The delegates agreed that the California Constitution ought to draw
upon, as one delegate put it, "the cream of the whole-the best material
of the Constitutions of the thirty States."22 The idea was to draw upon
the more than seventy years of experience of American constitution-mak-
ing. One delegate noted his preference to create a constitution "from the
thirty Constitutions of the Union," but felt that this process was best
initiated by taking a single constitution as a model.23 Another delegate
expressed uncertainty that their final product would be superior to the
constitutions of the other states, but predicted that by taking from state
constitutions "such provisions as were most applicable ... and by com-
bining the wisdom of the whole" the delegates might "make a better con-
stitution than could be accomplished in any other way."24
In addition to this self-consciously derivative approach, the debates
over California's first constitution lacked the visionary quality that ac-
companied the making of the Federal Constitution. The debates at Mon-
terey offered only faint echoes of the kind of breathless wonder and
heightened self-awareness of the unique task of framing a government
that filled the debates and writings of the eighteenth century Founding
Fathers.2" The qualitative difference may also contribute to the impres-
19. See e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; WITH THE
LATEST AMENDMENTS: ALSO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ARTICLES OF CON-
FEDERATION, WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1820); THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; WITH THE LATEST AMENDMENTS: ALSO THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1824).
20. THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, at 141-142 (C. Carey ed. 1926).
21. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 7-29.
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Id. at 28.
25. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
160-319 (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
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sion that what happened at Monterey was less inspired and hence less
significant.
Notwithstanding their lack of originality and self-absorption, the
Monterey delegates believed that the freedoms and liberties of future
Californians rested in their hands. The convention president set the tone
of the gathering in his opening address when he reminded delegates of
their task, stating, "You are called upon, by your fellow citizens, to exert
all your influence and power to secure to them all the blessings that a
good government can bestow upon a free people."26 Delegates, too, ac-
knowledged that they had been sent to Monterey "to form the organic
law" of a future state.2 7 They were "to perform the most solemn of
trusts-to decide upon the fundamental principles of a Government."28
The convention thus reflected the gravity of purpose and wisdom the
delegates associated with constitution-making in "the older States."
29
The delegates may well have created a "patchwork quilt" with re-
spect to the bill of rights, but they had a clear sense of its importance in
protecting the individual from the powers of government. Indeed, the
claim of unoriginality can be turned around to underscore the critical
importance delegates placed on establishing guarantees of freedoms and
rights in the constitution they drafted. The fact that the delegates care-
fully canvassed, studied, and ultimately chose provisions from many pre-
existing state constitutions supports the idea that they recognized they
were engaged in the important process of constitution building. The
comparative analysis of state constitutions within the convention, which
occurred on a broader scale than many have realized, is a measure of
their seriousness of purpose.
II. The Borrowing Begins
Traditional accounts of California's first constitutional convention
suggest that the deliberations were dominated by two principal models:
the state constitutions of Iowa and New York.3 ° William M. Gwin, the
San Francisco delegate and later one of California's first senators, had
taken the liberty of bringing enough printed copies of the Iowa Constitu-
tion to distribute to all the delegates. Gwin explained his choice of
Iowa's Constitution as a model "because it was one of the latest and
26. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 18.
27. id. at 28.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 28.
30. See, e.g., H. BANCROFT, supra note 10, at 289-90, 296; R. HUNT, supra note 10, at 55-
56; N. HARLOW, supra note 10, at 338.
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shortest."'" Even though the convention failed formally to adopt Iowa
as a model for consideration, it remains clear that Gwin's influence as a
member of the select committee to draft a bill of rights succeeded in
sending a proposal to the convention floor that drew heavily upon Iowa's
constitution. In fact, Gwin reported to the convention that half of the
proposed provisions came from Iowa's constitution and half from New
York's.32
A number of delegates urged the inclusion of certain principles be-
cause they seemed important after a reading of the thirty state constitu-
tions in force at the time.33 Moreover, apart from direct evidence
indicating that, copies of Iowa's and New York's constitutions were cir-
culating among delegates, numerous proposed provisions (unattributed
at the time) can be identified as verbatim borrowing from other state
constitutions. The Federal Constitution was mentioned as a possible
model for California's bill of rights, but its guidance was touted because
it "embraced the principles of all the State Constitutions.
'34
Not only did the delegates have thirty state models to draw from,
they also began their deliberations against the backdrop of a spate of
recent state constitution-making. Indeed, eight different states had held
conventions to draft new constitutions in the decade before the Monterey
convention. 35 Rhode Island drafted a new constitution in 1842, New
Jersey did so in 1844, and in 1845 both Texas and Louisiana drafted
constitutions. The oft-cited constitutions of Iowa and New York were
drafted in 1846, and Illinois and Wisconsin drafted new constitutions in
1848. Thus, the delegates at Monterey-some of whom had attended
and witnessed these other state conventions-not only had plenty of
models, but could draw upon the relatively recent experiences of other
states.
If the state constitutions were modeled after the Federal Constitu-
tion and, in effect, derived from it, one might expect that state constitu-
tional protections would tend to be greatly similar, if not identical to
federal protections. In a limited sense that may be true, but in matters of
constitutional interpretation, wording does make a difference. Califor-
31. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 24.
32. Id. at 31. Actually, of the sixteen provisions of the initial proposed bill of rights, eight
were drawn verbatim from and one was based upon New York's 1846 constitution, five were
drawn verbatim from and one was based upon Iowa's 1846 constitution, and the provision
prohibiting the quartering of soldiers copied the Third Amendment of the Federal Bill of
Rights which was also copied virtually verbatim in Iowa's constitution.
33. See, e.g., id. at 28, 36, 56.
34. Id. at 28.
35. W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, vol. 3, at 250, 434; vol. 4A, at 94; vol. 6, at 453; vol. 7, at
192; vol. 8, at 386; vol. 9, at 260; vol. 10, at 418.
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nia's first constitution, in common with the existing state constitutions of
the time, bore significant and substantial differences from the Federal
Constitution. Those differences meant that the final bill of rights adopted
in Monterey offered significantly broader coverage and protection of in-
dividual rights than did the Federal Bill of Rights.
In comparing the federal with state bills of rights, one should not
lose sight of the differing conceptions of the purpose of a national versus
a state government. The Federal Constitution, of course, was designed to
unite pre-existing governments-a significantly different task than form-
ing or reforming state governments. As such, it was only natural that a
perception of the appropriate limits to be placed on the national govern-
ment thousands of miles away might differ from limits placed on the
local government, which was at most only a few hundred miles away.
Nonetheless, because of the incorporation doctrine, under which the
United States Supreme Court has held many protections of the Federal
Bill of Rights applicable to the states, the language of the Federal Bill of
Rights-particularly as it differs from state bills of rights-is especially
important. The differing constitutional purposes that underlie the federal
versus state bills of rights only underscores the importance of the histori-
cal context in which nineteenth century state constitutions were formed
and changed.
The search for the sources of the California Bill of Rights quickly
reveals that almost every state bill of rights is longer than that of the
Federal Constitution (even including personal rights found elsewhere in
the federal model such as the writ of habeas corpus, Article IV privileges
and immunities, and the Contracts Clause).3 6 The point is not that state
constitutions were wordier in enumerating rights and protections in a bill
of rights, but that in describing those rights the state constitutions often
amplified and enlarged upon them, suggesting wider application and
greater protection than the Federal Bill of Rights. Whatever our attach-
ment to the familiar phrasing of the Federal Bill of Rights, the fact re-
mains that many, if not most, state constitutions clearly intended to
provide broader individual rights than did the federal model. Looking
only at the language used in California's Bill of Rights to describe similar
federal principles as well as the articulation of rights and protections not
found in the Federal Constitution, it becomes evident that broader pro-
tections are accorded under California's 1849 constitution than under the
Federal Constitution.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; art. I, § 10, dl. 1.
[Vol. 17:13
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III. The Federal Model
The Federal Constitution and California's constitution contain iden-
tical protections in only six areas: the right of habeas corpus, the right of
assembly, prohibitions on quartering soldiers, protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, a restrictive definition of treason, and the
assertion of the nonexclusivity of the enumeration of rights.37 Section 5
of California's bill of rights limited the circumstances under which the
writ of habeas corpus might be suspended in terms identical to Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution.3" Likewise, the provi-
sion for the right of assembly granted in the First Amendment to the
Federal Constitution was protected in very similar though not identical
terms in section 10 of California's constitution.39 California's section 13
restricted the quartering of soldiers in times of peace or war in virtually
identical terms as the Third Amendment. 4 Finally, the last three sec-
tions of California's bill of rights-sections 19, 20, and 21-were virtu-
ally identical with portions of the Federal Constitution that protected
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, defined treason, and
affirmed the principle that rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights did not
impair or deny others retained by the people.4" Of these six areas, only
37. Technically there are seven areas if section 16 of California's 1849 Declaration of
Rights is included. That section prohibited the passage of any bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. But since Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of
the Federal Constitution prohibited states from passing any such laws, section 16 provided no
protection that did not already exist.
38. Article I, section 5 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require its suspension."
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Federal Constitution provides: "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."
39. Article I, section 10 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "The people shall
have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances."
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, in part: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
40. Article I, section 13 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "No soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war,
except in the manner prescribed by law."
The Third Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: "No soldier shall, in time
of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but
in a manner prescribed by law."
41. Article I, section 19 of California's 1849 constitution provided:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.
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three-habeas corpus, assembly, and unreasonable searches and
seizures-might today be considered "core" principles in a bill of rights.
With respect to other basic liberties, such as freedom of speech and
religion, and right to jury trial, California's bill of rights often went be-
yond the Federal Constitution by adopting the broader language and
meaning of other state constitutions. For example, in civil cases the Sev-
enth Amendment grants a jury trial "[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars," but California's
section 3 provided that the right to a jury trial "shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate forever."'42 Thus, California imposed no threshold
level of an amount in controversy, even though it allowed parties to
waive jury trials in civil cases. In this regard the California convention
partially based section 3 on a provision of New York's constitution, but
California went further. New York's relevant provision limited that
right to "all cases in which it has been heretofore used," whereas the
California version omitted that language.43 With respect to criminal
cases, California's section 8 did not provide the Fifth Amendment's ex-
plicit and broad guarantee of a grand jury presentment or indictment,
but went beyond the language of the Fifth Amendment stating that "[in]
Compare the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, section 20 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "Treason against the
State shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the evidence of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or confession in open court." Compare Article III, Section 3, Clause I
of the Federal Constitution: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or in Confession in open Court."
Article I, section 21 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "This enumeration of
rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people." Compare the
Ninth Amendment to the Federal Constitution: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
42. Article I, section 3 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "'The right of trial by
jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the
parties, in all civil cases, in the manner to be prescribed by law." The Seventh Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, on the other hand, provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
43. Article I, section 2 of New York's 1846 constitution, on which California's section 3
was based, provided: "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall
remain inviolate forever; but a jury-trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the
manner prescribed by law."
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any trial in any court whatever, the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defend in person and with counsel, as in civil actions."'
In terms of freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion, a
comparison between the First Amendment and California's provisions
reveals that the California Constitution also offered broader coverage.
Instead of the First Amendment's terse prohibition of any "law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," California's delegates
drew verbatim from New York's constitution to provide positive affirma-
tion that "[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or the
press."'45 Likewise, California's bill of rights offered an additional gloss
on the First Amendment's prohibition against any "law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Cali-
fornia's section 4 affirmatively provided for the "free exercise and enjoy-
ment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference," and it further specified that "no person shall be rendered
incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of
religious belief"-a protection not explicitly provided by the Federal
Constitution.46
44. Article I, section 8 of California's 1849 constitution provided, in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime (except
in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in actual service, and the land
and naval forces in time of war, or which this State may keep with the consent of
Congress in time of peace, and in case of petit larceny under the regulation of the
Legislature) unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and in any trial in
any court whatever, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person
and with counsel, as in civil actions. (Emphasis added).
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, on the other hand, provided, in part: "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... "
45. The full text of article I, section 9 of the 1849 California Constitution provided:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions on indict-
ments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear
to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the fact.
California's section 9 drew verbatim from article I, section 8 of New York's constitution.
46. The full text of article I, section 4 of 1849 California Constitution provided:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-
crimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State; and no person shall
be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of
religious belief; but the liberty of conscience, hereby secured, shall not be so con-
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this State.
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A clearer example of the California delegates extending a federally
guaranteed right concerns the provisions regarding bail. The Eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides in part, "Excessive bail
shall not be required .... I Section 6 of California's bill of rights con-
tained the exact same prohibition but, in addition, California's delegates
inserted a provision, section 7, that declared "[a]ll persons shall be baila-
ble, by sufficient sureties: unless for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident or the presumption great.",48 This extension of making bail more
widely available was a right that could be found in dozens of state consti-
tutions from the time of Kentucky's 1799 constitution through the 1848
Illinois Constitution.49 The particular wording that California adopted
in section 7 was copied verbatim from the identical language found in the
Ohio and Indiana Constitutions. °
IV. Borrowing Beyond the Federal Model
If the incorporation of state constitutional provisions tended to ex-
pand the scope of rights or principles that could be found in the Federal
Constitution, that borrowing process had even greater significance when
provisions had no analog in the Federal Bill of Rights. Some of the obvi-
ous departures, such as the prohibition against slavery (section 18), were
products of the antebellum political debate. 5' Jacksonian democracy and
the political culture it fostered also account for broad assertions of polit-
ical equality, such as the requirements (drawn from Iowa's constitution)
that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation (section 11)
or that representation shall be apportioned according to population (sec-
tion 14).52 Iowa's constitution also proved to be the source of an even
more general proclamation of fundamental political principles, namely
This section was taken verbatim from article I, section 3 of the 1846 New York Constitution.
47. The full text of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution reads: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
48. Article I, section 6 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be in-
flicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."
49. See, e.g., article X, section 16 of Kentucky's 1799 constitution; article I, section 17 of
Alabama's 1819 constitution; article II, section 16 of Arkansas's 1836 constitution; article
XIII, section 13 of Illinois's 1848 constitution, in W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, vol. 4, at 163;
vol. 1, at 32, 339; vol. 3, at 268.
50. See article VIII, section 12 of Ohio's 1802 constitution; article I, section 14 of Indi-
ana's 1816 constitution, in SWINDLER, supra note 3, vol. 7, at 554; vol. 3, at 366.
51. Article I, section 18 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "Neither slavery nor
involunary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this state."
52. Article I, section 11 of California's 1849 constitution provided: "All laws of a general
nature shall have a uniform operation" and article I, section 14 of that same constitution read:
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the section 2 declaration, "Allpolitical power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the
people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same, whenever the
public good may require it."53
Another provision (taken verbatim from Iowa's constitution) pro-
hibited imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud. 4 A further pro-
vision, also based on Iowa's constitution, provided that foreign residents
in California were to enjoy the same property rights as native-born
citizens.5
Iowa also provided the source for two other sections that, in part,
reflected eighteenth century constitutional concerns. The American rev-
olutionary generation had deeply rooted fears of standing armies and re-
strictions against them often found their way into the early state
constitutions. While the Federal Constitution contained restrictions
against quartering soldiers in private homes-anolher grievance of the
American Revolutionaries-it contained no restrictions against standing
armies other than limiting Congress's ability to support armies by appro-
priations of up to two years at a time.5 6 California's section 12 explicitly
reaffirmed the eighteenth century republican principle that "the military
shall be subordinate to the civil power" and that "no standing army shall
be kept up by this state in time of peace."'5'  The other California consti-
tutional section that had its origins in eighteenth century expressions of
American constitutionalism and that did not appear in the Federal Con-
stitution was section one. A close paraphrase of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, that section provided: "All men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
"Representation shall be apportioned according to population." For similar provisions in
Iowa's constitution, compare article I, section 6 (laws having uniform nature).
53. Article I, section 2 of Iowa's 1846 constitution.
54. Article I, section 15 of California's 1849 constitution (taken verbatim from article I,
section 19 of Iowa's 1846 constitution) provided: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in
any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud; and no person shall be
imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace."
55. Article I, section 17 of California's 1849 constitution (apparently based on article I,
section 22 of Iowa's 1846 constitution) provided: "Foreigners who are, or who may hereafter
become bonafide residents of this state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession,
enjoyment, and inheritance of property, as native-born citizens."
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 12.
57. Article I, section 12 of California's 1849 constitution (taken almost verbatim from
article I, section 14 of Iowa's 1846 constitution) provided: "The military shall be subordinate
to the civil power. No standing army shall be kept up by this state in time of peace; and, in
time of war, no appropriation for a standing army shall be for a longer time than two years."
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tecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." 58
With the exception of the addition of the right of privacy and with minor
changes of grammar and gender, this provision remains as the first sec-
tion of California's current bill of fights.
Virtually all of the state constitutions contained, as did California's,
references to additional rights and principles that are absent in the fed-
eral model. The wider availability of bail, the prohibition against impris-
onment for debt, and the assertion that "the military shall at all times be
subordinate to the civil authority" were ideas consistently enshrined in
state bills of rights.5 9
Finally, the phraseology of specific provisions and the final version
of article I suggests that delegates sought to provide a host of enumerated
and described rights. In this sense they proved themselves more venture-
some than the drafters of the Federal Constitution. Indeed, California's
1849 Bill of Rights suggests that its authors not only wished to safeguard
individual liberties by crafting language to prohibit and restrict what the
state government could do, but also sought to affirm inalienable rights
that the people possessed and that the government should inculcate and
support. Thus, the framers may have sown the seeds for two enormous
developments beyond the scope of the Federal Constitution: requiring
the state to promote individual liberties and giving constitutional protec-
tion to purely private infringements of those individual liberties.
V. Efforts At Originality That Failed
Following his complaints about the lack of originality of the consti-
tution they were drafting, one delegate proposed an addition to the bill of
rights designed to ensure that at least one section was wholly original.
He sought to add the following directive of constitutional interpretation
that went beyond the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution:
"As constitutions are the instruments by which the powers of the people
are delegated to their representatives, they ought to be construed strictly,
58. California's section 1 was identical to article I, section 1 of Iowa's 1846 constitution,
except that California's constitution substituted "independent" for the word "equal." The
language was also reminiscent of the statement in the Declaration of Independence that: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness."
59. The language of the subordination of military power comes from article I, section 17
of Texas's 1845 constitution and is typical of the language used in other state constitutions.
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and all powers, not expressly granted, should be taken to be reserved."6
The convention declined to indulge his request that there be "at least one
original section in the Constitution"; nor did it accept such a strict con-
structionist statement in the California Constitution.61
Another proposed section for California's bill of rights would have
provided more far-reaching protection for individuals accused of crimes
than anything enumerated in the Federal Bill of Rights. Immediately
after the prohibition on slavery was passed, Lansford Hastings, a Sacra-
mento delegate, proposed a new section that declared, "As the true de-
sign of all punishment is to reform and not exterminate mankind, death
shall never be inflicted as a punishment for crime in this State."'62 Has-
tings did not defend his proposal on religious or philosophical grounds,
but rather on the basis that it was beyond the power of the government to
take the life of one of its citizens. Hastings posited that the government
had no rights, as a government, other than those it derived from the
people, as the source of popular sovereignty. Thus, the people could not
transfer rights they did not have to their government. Since justifiable
homicide hinged upon self-defense, and since individuals within the com-
munity were unjustified in pursuing and killing persons who killed in the
absence of self-defense, the government could not claim a right that did
not belong to the people. Hastings argued,
Life is taken; the party is arraigned long after the act is committed.
The Government, in cold blood, pursues, arrests, and murders the
criminal. Why can the Government, the representative of individ-
uals, do this, when the individuals themselves cannot do it?-when
it is admitted that no right can be delegated by individuals which
they do not possess?
63
Hastings also urged his proposal on the grounds that while one goal
of punishment was deterrence, the overriding goal was to reform the in-
dividual.' 4 He argued that, in any event, life imprisonment was a more
effective deterrent to criminals than the death penalty.65 Although one
delegate half-heartedly seconded consideration of Hastings' proposal, the
60. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 51. The Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
only provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
61. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 51.
62. Id. at 45. Hastings's conclusion that the death penalty should be unconstitutional
might have been original, but he appeared to take the premise for that conclusion verbatim
from article XIII, section 14 of the 1848 Illinois Constitution that provided: "All penalties
shall be proportioned to the nature of the offence [sic]; the true design of all punishment being
to reform, not to exterminate mankind."
63. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 45.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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convention-with no recorded debate-quickly rejected making the
death penalty unconstitutional. 6
This comparative analysis of provisions in the Federal Constitution
that protect individual liberty and freedom with those of California's first
bill of fights is not intended to disparage the very real and important
individual freedoms granted by the United States Constitution. Rather,
the intent has been to show that by the literal terms of the two docu-
ments, California's delegates often went further than did the Framers of
the Federal Constitution. But this tendency was not entirely uniform.
As previously noted, the broader language in the Fifth Amendment re-
quiring presentment and indictment is not paralleled in California's
analogous provision. In only one area, however, did the Federal Bill of
Rights clearly provide a substantive fight omitted in California's consti-
tution: the fight to bear arms. Article seven of the 1849 constitution
provided for the organization of the militia, but did not couple its crea-
tion, as did the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution, with
"the fight of the people to keep and bear Arms.
' 6 8
VI. The Nature of the Enterprise
Early in the deliberations over the bill of fights draft proposed by
the select committee, one member objected to the proposal because it
contained a number of "legislative enactments. ' 69 A bill of fights, he
argued, "should only be declaratory of general fundamental princi-
ples."7" He wanted the convention to accept explicitly this idea as its
guiding light in framing the bill of fights. While a resolution to that
effect failed, subsequent events demonstrated that, by and large, the con-
vention shared the sentiments expressed in the resolution.71
66. Id.
67. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68. Article 7 of the 1849 constitution contained the following three sections:
See. 1. The Legislature shall provide by law for organizing and disciplining the
militia, in such manner as they shall deem expedient, not incompatible with the con-
stitution and the laws of the United States.
Sec. 2. Officers of the militia shall be elected, or appointed in such manner as
the legislature shall from time to time direct, and shall be commissioned by the gov-
ernor.
Sec. 3. The governor shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the
laws of the state, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
In comparison, the Second Amendment of the Federal Constitution simply provided that
"[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
69. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 32.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 30-31; W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, vol. 1, at 447-48.
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This issue resurfaced when the convention began to discuss the pro-
posed seventh section that specified the procedures for compensating in-
dividuals whose land was taken by the state (including the process of
converting private roads to public ones).72 The immediately preceding
section-approved by the convention-had contained a guarantee of due
process before takings of life, liberty, or property as well as a prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use "without just com-
pensation."7 Several delegates objected to the seventh section as inap-
propriate to the bill of rights. As one delegate said, "The pages of the
Constitution should not be encumbered with regulations in regard to lo-
cal improvements." 74 This shared sentiment of the convention also ac-
counted for the rejection of proposed provisions .that forbade lotteries,
limited the granting of divorces, and disqualified duelists from public of-
fice. 75 Nonetheless, all three of these provisions ultimately found their
way into other portions of the constitution.76
Although delegates agreed to exclude "legislative enactments" from
the bill of rights, what some of them considered "legislative" and hence
inappropriate for the bill of rights might strike one as unusual today.
For example, given the absence of a right to bear arms in the proposed
bill of rights, one delegate proposed a section drawn verbatim from
Michigan's constitution that stated, "Every person has a right to bear
arms for the defence [sic] of himself and the State."'77 In the discussion
72. This proposed section (taken verbatim from article I, section 7 of New York's 1846
constitution) provided:
When private property shall be taken for any public use, the compensation to be
made therefore, when such compensation is not made by the State, shall be ascer-
tained by a jury, or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of
record, as shall be prescribed by law. Private roads may be opened in the manner to
be prescribed by law; but in every case the necessity of the road, and the amount of
all damage to be sustained by the opening thereof, shall be first determined by a jury
of freeholders, and such amount, together with the expenses of the proceeding, shall
be paid by the person to be benefited.
73. The relevant portion of this section (which ultimately became article I, section 8)
provided: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
74. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 41.
75. Proposed section 9 of the select committee provided in part: "No law shall be passed
... nor shall any divorce be granted, otherwise than by due judicial proceedings, nor shall any
lottery hereafter be authorized, or any sale of lottery tickets be allowed within this State."
Proposed section 10 provided: "Any citizen of this State who may hereafter be engaged, either
directly or indirectly, in a duel, either as principal or accessory before the fact, shall forever be
disqualified from holding any office under the Constitution and laws of this State." For discus-
sion of these proposals, see J. BROWNE, supra note I, at 42-43.
76. See article IV, sections 26 (no divorces granted by legislature) and 27 (no lotteries)
and article XI, section 2 (dueling) of California's 1849 constitution.
77. This proposed language was taken verbatim from article I, section 13 of Michigan's
1835 constitution.
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that ensued, another delegate suggested that the proposal be amended to
read, "providing they are not concealed arms," but eventually opposed
the section on the grounds that it was too "legislative" for a bill of
rights.78 A sufficient number of delegates apparently agreed that it was
either inappropriate or unnecessary to entrench that right into the bill of
rights; as a result, the proposal failed.7 9 Even section nineteen (incorpo-
rating the Fourth Amendment's language against unreasonable searches
and seizures) drew objection to its placement in a bill of rights, on the
ground that it "properly belonged to another part of the Constitution.2
80
In this case, however, that objection was not sustained by a majority of
the convention.
At one level, characterizing provisions as "legislative" or "funda-
mental" reflected a shifting understanding of what constitutions were
supposed to accomplish. From the start of American constitution-mak-
ing a tension existed between the notion of a constitution as a document
"broadly outlining the structure and powers of government, and the pre-
vailing state model of the constitution as that plus a mass of codelike
specifications., 81 The course of nineteenth century state constitution-
making reveals a shift toward a general acceptance of constitutions
loaded with codelike provisions. The political pressures underlying this
shift are better understood than how notions of constitutionalism
changed to accommodate the result. California's 1849 convention offers
an intriguing glimpse of the struggle to define the function of a constitu-
tion at mid-century.
VII. The Nineteenth Century View
The idea that the bill of rights ought simply to declare what one
delegate described as "general fundamental principles"8 2 raises the ques-
tion of what those principles were. One insight can be found in nine-
teenth century constitutionalism and was manifested in the eight state
constitutions drafted in the decade immediately preceding the Monterey
convention. Not only do the eight state constitutions span a period that
includes California's constitution-making, but they represent a broad ge-
ographical spectrum from New England to the deep South to the North-
east to the Midwest to the West.83 Indeed, elements that bind these
78. J. BROWNE, supra note 1, at 47.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 48.
81. See Keller, supra note 9, at 70.
82. See supra text accompanying note 70.
83. The eight states were Rhode Island (1842), New Jersey (1844), Texas (1845), Louisi-
ana (1845), Iowa (1846), New York (1846), Illinois (1848), and Wisconsin (1848).
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constitutions together and distinguish them from the Federal Constitu-
tion provide an excellent clue to the significant changes in the constitu-
tionalism of the nineteenth century.
The state constitutions framed in the 1840s shared with the Califor-
nia Constitution a core of rights and protections that in substance harken
back to the Federal Constitution. Nearly all of them included prohibi-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive bail and
asserted the rights of freedom of speech and of religion, due process, jury
trials and procedures, the right of assembly, and the writ of habeas
corpus. But, as noted with respect to California, those rights tended to
be affirmatively expressed rather than, as in the Federal Constitution,
protected simply by prohibiting governmental action. While state consti-
tutions often contained a "state action" limitation, what is significant is
that such language was usually linked with positive assertions or affirma-
tions of principle that might also prohibit individual, private actors from
abridging those rights. New Jersey's opening sentence in its constitu-
tional section dealing with freedom of speech aptly illustrates this point.
The section began, "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects. . . ."4 Likewise, Rhode Island's relevant
section began, "The liberty of the press being essential to the security of
freedom in a State, any person may publish his sentiments on any subject
. , Such affirmative language describing these principles was fre-
quently, as in California's case, couched in broader terms than can be
found in the Federal Constitution, raising the notion that these provi-
sions would be read to prohibit purely private conduct.
Indeed, the best indication of this positive affirmation of rights and
the implied burden on state government to secure them to individuals
against public and possibly private infringement can be found in the bills
of rights of Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Illinois. Each of these states
had a provision in its constitution that proclaimed the citizen's right to
expect justice and remedies for all legal wrongs. Illinois's provision was
typical:
Every person within this State ought to find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character; he ought to obtain right and justice freely,
and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, comformably to the laws. 6
84. Article I, section 5, New Jersey's 1844 constitution.
85. Article I, section 20, Rhode Island's 1842 constitution.
86. Article XIII, section 12, Illinois's 1848 constitution (emphasis added).
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These provisions recently have sparked much interest in the wake of leg-
islative efforts to limit tort recovery as a means of stemming the bur-
geoning amounts of tort liability.17  Challenges are now surfacing,
charging that such limits offend these constitutional provisions that ap-
pear to guarantee all remedies for all legal wrongs."
VIII. The Source of Power-Popular Sovereignty
Virtually all of the state constitutions began their bills of rights with
broad statements reflecting their political and constitutional understand-
ing of the source and purposes of their governments. Almost all of these
constitutions alluded to or explicitly declared the principle of popular
sovereignty as the foundation of their constitution-making in terms that
harkened back to the "We the people" language of the Federal Constitu-
tion. Rhode Island, for example, invoked George Washington's declara-
tion: "That the basis of our political systems is the right of the people to
make and alter their constitutions of government . . . ."I Other states,
like Illinois, simply stated, "[A]ll power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority ....
Often associated with this identification of the source of governmen-
tal power was a declaration of the purposes of government and the ina-
lienable rights of the people. New Jersey's constitution explained that
government was instituted "for the protection, security, and benefit of
the people."91 The nature of "the people" and their rights were often
described in broadly affirmative terms. Typical was Illinois's constitu-
tion that began its bill of rights by declaring, "That all men are born
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
and of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and
of pursuing their own happiness."92 California's 1849 constitution began
87. See, eg., Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251
(1988); Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1988); Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp. Inc., 24
Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 482 N.E.2d 1358 (C.P. 1985).
88. Id.
89. Article I, section 1, of Rhode Island's 1842 constitution reads as follows:
In the words of the Father of his Country, we declare: "That the basis of our polit-
ical systems is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, vol. 8, at 387.
90. Article XIII, section 2, Illinois's 1848 constitution.
91. Article I, section 2, New Jersey's 1844 constitution.
92. Article XIII, section 1, Illinois's 1848 constitution.
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its bill of rights in similar terms,93 though drawing, perhaps, more di-
rectly upon Iowa's 1846 constitution.
These statements of inalienable rights, though reminiscent of the
Declaration of Independence, were not to be found in the Federal Consti-
tution. These declarations were more than mere rhetoric and offer indi-
cations of the political climate of the times. The bills of rights of both
Illinois and Wisconsin-each drafted the year before California's consti-
tution-contained a separate section stressing the vital importance of the
"fundamental principles" they were entrenching in their constitutions.
Illinois's bill of rights included the observation "That a frequent recur-
rence to the fundamental principles of civil government is absolutely nec-
essary to preserve the blessings of liberty."94 Wisconsin's constitution
was even more explicit. Its bill of rights concluded with the assertion
that "[t]he blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue,
and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.- 95
Conclusion
This limited perusal of constitution-making in other states suggests
that California's broader language and protections in its bill of rights
than in the Federal Constitution was not unique. Indeed, while the exact
dimensions of antebellum constitutionalism must await further study, it
is evident that a pre-Civil War understanding existed about the nature
and meaning of American constitutionalism. One apparent source of
that understanding was the change in political and social attitudes fos-
tered by Jacksonian democracy. But detailing the shifts in attitudes
about the role and function of government, the interrelationship between
law and written constitutions must await future research. Likewise, the
backgrounds of the participants, their concerns, and understanding of
the process in which they were engaged must also receive considerably
more attention before we can begin to speak broadly about the intentions
of the framers of nineteenth century state constitutions.
In the final analysis, California's process of constitution-making pro-
vides further evidence of the existence of a well-developed nineteenth
century legal culture. Legal historians, principally John Reid and David
Langum, have identified particular attitudes and an understanding of law
among the Americans who came to California before and during the
93. Article I, section 1, California's 1849 constitution.
94. Article XIII, section 19, Illinois's 1848 constitution.
95. Article I, section 22, Wisconsin's 1848 constitution.
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Gold Rush. 96 Langum, for example, has shown that immigrants to Cali-
fornia expected a legal system to provide certainty, predictability, and
efficiency in the enforcement of judgments and that they criticized the
absence of those elements in the Mexican California system.97 This re-
view of state constitution-making suggests that the goals and objectives
of those coming to California were much broader and more ambitious
than previously believed. The work of the Monterey convention in 1849
suggests that the nineteenth century American legal culture had a shared
constitutional dimension as well. Western history and California's legal
history-including its constitutional history-will inevitably help explain
the nature of American law in the nineteenth century. Moreover, closer
attention to the formation of California's first constitution also aids the
ongoing task of interpreting California's bill of rights.
96. J. REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE
OVERLAND TRAIL (1980); D. LANGUM, LAW AND COMMUNITY ON THE MEXICAN CALIFOR-
NIA FRONTIER: ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPATRIATES AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS,
1821-1846 (1987); see also Reid, Some Lessons of Western Legal History, in 1 WESTERN LEGAL
HIST. 3-21 (1988).
97. See D. LANGUM, supra note 96, at 131-52.
[Vol. 17:13
